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Abstract
This paper estimates the cyclicality of real wages using a VAR approach. Long-run
restrictions on the behavior of aggregate hours and output identify labor supply, technology, oil
price, and aggregate demand shocks. It is shown that real wages are procyclical in response to
technology and oil price shocks but are countercyclical in response to aggregate demand shocks.
The evidence is consistent with models where nominal wages are stickier than nominal prices.
The results point out the importance of looking at the cyclicality of real wages in response to the
shocks that drive business cycles, rather than at the simple correlation between real wages and
output or the unemployment rate.The Causes of Business Cycles and
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I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a great deal of recent interest in understanding the cyclicality of real
wages. Bils (1985) and Solon, Barsky, and Parker (SBP, 1992) found real wages to be
significantly procyclical, overturning many years of macroeconomic wisdom. Neftci (1978) and
Sargent (1978) had earlier found real wages to be countercyclical, while Geary and Kennan
(1982) found real wages to be acyclical.
A model's ability to explain procyclical movements in real wages has become a
benchmark by which macroeconomists judge business cycle theories. Keynesian models with
sticky nominal wages have been criticized and dismissed because they predict countercyclical real
wages. McCallum (1986) summarizes the criticisms of models with sticky nominal wages. He
writes: "If wage stickiness alone were responsible for the real effects of monetary actions, with
product prices adjusting flexibly, then we should observe countercyclical movements in the real
wage. That we do not has recently been reconfirmed by Bils (1985).''
Real Business Cycle (RBC) models (Kydland and Prescott, 1990; and others) explain
procyclical real wages within their explicitly market clearing framework. Technology shocks
move output and real wages, which are equal to the marginal product of labor, in the same
direction. These models, however, have been criticized for, among other things, predicting real
wage movements that are much more procyclical than those observed in aggregate data. SBP
showed that countercyclical composition bias in aggregate real wage series causes studies using
aggregate data to understate the true procyclicality of real wages. Despite their consistency with
the stylized fact of real wage cyclicality, RDC models are still controversial because they allow
no channel through which nominal variables can affect real output (King, Plosser, Stock, and
Watson, 1991).
Recent New Keynesian models that attribute movements in real output to the effects of
aggregate demand shocks are also consistent with procyclical real wages. There are several
varieties of models that have been classified under the broad New Keynesian heading. Models
'McCallum (1986), p. 428. An exception to this is the knife-edged case in Taylor (1979)
where prices are a constant markup over nominal wages, and real wages are acyclical.
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of imperfect competition with nominal prices stickier than nominal wages (Mankiw, 1985; and
many others) predict procyclical movements in real wages in response to aggregate demand
shocks. In direct response to the findings of procyclical real wages, Rotemberg and Woodford
(1991) offer an alternative model that does not rely on nominal rigidities. They explain the
procyclical response of real wages to aggregate demand shocks as the result of imperfect
competition and countercyclical markups of prices over marginal costs, of which nominal wages
are a significant component.
The empirical studies and theoretical models cited above constrain real wages to exhibit
the same cyclicality, independent of the causes of the fluctuations in output. Blanchard and
Watson (1986) identify several types of shocks that cause business cycles. They also show that
the cyclical covariance of real wages varies across post-war business cycles, suggesting that real
wage cyclicality may differ depending on the causes of business cycles.
The Fischer (1977) model of long-term nominal wage contracts allows both aggregate
supply and demand shocks to affect output. In this model, a positive aggregate demand shock
(monetary shock) causes real wages to decline, allowing firms to hire more labor and increase
output. The Fischer model has been criticized for predicting countercyclical real wages. The
model, however, also predicts procyclical movements in real wages in response to aggregate
supply shocks. Bils and SBP studied periods with several important supply shocks, including two
OPEC oil price shocks and the onset of the "productivity slowdown." This might explain the
overall procyclical pattern of real wages found in these two studies, even if long-term nominal
wage contracts are important.
This paper examines the importance of studying the cyclicality of real wages in response
to the various shocks that affect the economy. It builds upon an existing literature that has
identified aggregate supply and demand shocks within vector autoregression models of the
economy. Blanchard and Quah (BQ, 1989) and Shapiro and Watson (SW, 1988) identify
aggregate supply shocks as those that can have permanent effects on real output, and aggregate
demand shocks as those that can have only transitory effects on real output. This methodology
is derived from the neoclassical synthesis, which posits that output movements can be divided
into their long-run growth components and short-run cyclical components. By allowing the
factors that move the economy in the long run to contribute to variations in output at all
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frequencies, BQ and SW take a more agnostic view of business cycles.
SW build transitory dynamics resulting from aggregate demand shocks onto a simple real
business cycle model. I extend the SW model to explicitly incorporate real wage dynamics. The
principal aim of this paper is to include the real wage in the model without adding an additional
structural shock. SW identify five shocks that explain all of the variation in output at all
horizons. Any additional shock must have no effect on output (or the other variables in the SW
model) at any horizon. This shock must also have only transitory effects on the real wage.
Following SW and many earlier balanced growth models, I use a constant returns to scale Cobb-
Douglas production function for long-run aggregate output. With the Cobb-Douglas production
function, there is nothing that has permanent effects on real wages but not on output. In the long
run, output is determined by the level of labor supply, the level of technology, and real oil prices,
which, in turn, are determined by the accumulation of past labor supply shocks, technology
shocks, and oil price shocks. I will show that in the long run, the real wage is determined by
the level of technology and real oil prices.
I use this variant of the SW model to study the cyclicality of real wages in response to
supply and demand shocks. I examine the impulse response functions of output, real wages, and
average labor productivity in response to each of the three supply shocks. In addition, I use the
forecast errors in output and real wages due to each of the shocks to construct two measures of
their cyclical covariance. The first is the simple correlations between output and real wages in
response to the shocks. The second is the output elasticity of real wages in response to the
shocks. This second measure allows comparison with other studies of aggregate real wage
cyclicality.
The results are generally consistent with Keynesian models of aggregate supply with
nominal wages stickier than nominal prices, and with simple models of labor supply and demand.
Labor supply shocks cause roughly acyclical movements in real wages in the short run.
Technology shocks and oil price shocks result in very procyclical real wages. Aggregate demand
shocks move real wages countercyclically.
These findings are consistent with other studies that have examined the cyclicality of real
wages in response to different shocks affecting the economy. Liederman (1982) shows that
Barro-style unanticipated movements in money supply result in countercyclical real wages.
Cogley (1993), using a VAR methodology to test the neutrality of money in the short and
medium run, finds that nominal wages are stickier than nominal prices, resulting in
countercyclical movements in real wages in response to monetary shocks. Blanchard (1989),
using a traditional VAR with contemporaneous rather than long-run restrictions, finds slightly
countercyclical real wages in response to aggregate demand shocks. Sumner and Silver (1989)
find that real wages move either procyclically or countercyclically, depending on the choice of
sample period. They find that in years in which there is a positive correlation between change
in the inflation rate and change in the unemployment rate (countercyclical inflation), which they
interpret as years dominated by aggregate supply shocks, the real wage is procyclical. In
contrast, they find that in years in which the change in the inflation rate and the unemployment
rate are negatively correlated, the real wage is countercyclical.
Following this introduction, Section II introduces the model I use to study the cyclicality
of real wages. Section III describes the data and addresses data related issues that determine the
proper specification of the model. Section IV explains the estimation strategy. Section V
discusses the results, and Section VI concludes.
II. THE MODEL
This paper develops a close variant of the model presented in Shapiro and Watson (1988).
First, I describe the basic five equation SW model. Next, I explain how I append a real wage
equation to the basic model by including a non-allocative measurement error shock.
The Basic Shapiro and Watson Model
SW used their model to understand the causes of business cycles. Their most important
identifying assumption is the decomposition of output into permanent and transitory components.
The SW model is based on a simple balanced growth model of the economy. In the long run,
output is determined by the size of the labor force (labor supply) and the state of technology.
The long-run capital-to-output ratio is assumed constant. In the short run, variables are allowed
to differ from their long-run levels.
In the SW model, long-run labor supply and technology evolve according to:
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Using (4), I can eliminate output from (5) to find:




(2) e,' - , + ,-+ 8(L)e,
where h', is long-run labor supply and E , is the long-run level of technology.
2 v, is the labor
supply innovation and e, is the innovation in technology. The innovations are mutually and
serially uncorrelated. e(L) and 9,(L) have strictly transitory dynamics, allowing the long-run
levels of technology and labor supply to exhibit more intricate dynamics than a simple random
walk. Long-run labor supply is exogenous. The position of the perfectly inelastic labor supply
curve is determined solely by the accumulation of previous labor supply shocks, such as growth
in population or changes in labor force participation rates.
The long-run level of output is determined according to the Cobb-Douglas production
function:
(3) y,* = ah,' + (1-a)k,' +e'
Applying the implication of balanced growth models that the capital-to-output ratio is constant
(y' = , + k*,), and suppressing constants, the production function can be rewritten as:
(4) y,' = h, + ()e,a
Equation (4) shows the restrictions that only labor supply and technology shocks can have
permanent effects on output. Given the production function (3) and the constancy of the capital-
to-output ratio, I can solve for the labor demand curve:
(5) w* = (a - 1)hr'+ (1 - a)y, + e
2A1 variables are natural logarithms, and all constants are subsequently suppressed.
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In the long run, the real wage will be a function only of the accumulation of technology shocks
and will be equal to the marginal product of labor (y, - h*,), holding the long-run capital-to-
output ratio constant.
Along a balanced growth path with constant returns to scale technology, the capital stock
evolves according to:
(7) Ak,' = Ah, + (!)Ae,
A labor supply shock has a long-run effect on the labor force but no effect on the level
of technology. In response to a labor supply shock, the change in the capital stock is equal to
the change in the labor force, leaving the capital-to-labor ratio unchanged. The long-run marginal
product of labor, and hence the long-run real wage, is a function of the capital-to-labor ratio.
With the capital-to-labor ratio unchanged in the long run, a labor supply shock can have no
permanent effect on the real wage. Conversely, the long-run real wage responds to a technology
shock because the long-run capital stock adjusts in response to a technology shock but the long-
run labor force does not. The change in the long-run capital-to-labor ratio causes a permanent
change in the real wage.
Equations (1), (2), (3) and (6) define a very simple real business cycle model that
attributes all movements in hours, output, and wages to aggregate supply shocks and permits no
deviations from the long-run values. The SW model allows for strictly transitory movements in
output and hours by including two aggregate demand shocks, which are loosely interpreted as IS
and LM shocks. One additional variable must be included in the model for each shock. In order
to identify two demand shocks, Shapiro and Watson included the ex poste real interest rate and
the inflation rate.
SW place no restrictions on the short-run dynamics of any of the variables in the system.
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Movements in actual hours and output will be a combination of the long-run dynamics from (1)
and (2) and strictly transitory dynamics. Transitory movements in hours and output can be
explained by the effects of aggregate demand shocks, which are neutral in the long run, and by
off-the-labor supply curve and off-the-production function behavior that can result from the
adjustment to either aggregate supply or aggregate demand shocks.
Equation (1) shows that hours contain a unit root. Together (1) and (2) imply that output
also contains a unit root that can be attributed to both labor supply and technology. In order to
estimate the model, actual hours and output must be differenced. The first-differenced equations
are:
(8) Ah, - 9,(v,) + (1 - L)E,(L)(v,, e,, d, d2)
and
(9) Ay, = 9,(v,) + 1 0(e,) + (1 - L)E,(L)(v,, e,, d,', d,)
where d', and d, are the two aggregate demand shocks. These shocks are serially uncorrelated
and uncorrelated with the aggregate supply shocks. Equations (8) and (9) include the restrictions
that aggregate demand shocks have only transitory effects on hours and output, and show that
the effects of the permanent shocks can have strictly transitory components, as well.
Equations (8) and (9) also embody the cross-equation restriction implied by (4): Labor
supply shocks have the same long-run impacts on hours and output. From (8), all long-run
movements in labor supply will be due to ea(L)v,. Similarly, (9) shows that long-run movements
in output not due to movements in technology (captured by e,(L)e,) are due to Oh(L)v,. Equation
(6) shows that this also implies that labor supply shocks have no long-run effect on the real
wage, because they have no long-run effect on the output-to-labor ratio, which is equal to the
long-run capital-to-labor ratio.
Appending Real Wage Dynamics to the Basic Shapiro and Watson Model
To study the dynamic properties of the real wage, I include an additional equation for the
real wage and an additional shock. Were I to include an equation for the real wage without
including an additional shock, I would be making the strong overidentifying assumption that all
of the variance in the real wage is explained by the shocks already included in the model.
Clearly, this overidentifying restriction would be rejected by the data.3
The additional real wage shock must satisfy several conditions. First, it can have no
effect on output or any of the other variables included in the SW model at any horizons. SW
identify five structural shocks that span the space of shocks that can affect the variables included
in the basic model. Second, in the long run, the real wage is determined by the level of
technology. The additional shock can have only transitory effects on the real wage.
The real wage shock will represent the non-allocative movements (or non-movements) in
real wages that do not match movements in productivity and that are not explained by the five
structural shocks. The presence of long-term labor contracts, both formal and implicit, implies
that there are non-allocative movements (or non-movements) in real wages. These contracts,
however, probably cannot explain all of the movements in real wages not explained by the
structural shocks. Other possible interpretations for the real wage shock, like changes in the rates
of unionization or in the markup ratio, would imply an affect on employment and, hence, output.
In the absence of economically meaningful candidates for this type of shock, I follow
Altug (1989) in adding a "measurement error" shock to the real wage equation. Altug confronts
a similar problem in estimating the dynamics of a real business cycle model driven by a single
technology shock. Recognizing that the time series of the actual variables will differ somewhat
from the dynamics implied by the model, Altug includes a vector of measurement errors, one for
each variable. Here, following Altug, I allow the real wage to differ from the real wage implied
by the effects of the five structural shocks by including a "measurement error" shock. The actual
real wage will behave according to:
'Indirectly, I will perform this test and show that the overidentifying restriction is rejected.
I estimate the unrestricted model and find that approximately 40 percent of the one-quarter ahead
forecast error in real wages cannot be explained by the five structural shocks. Smaller, though
statistically significant, fractions of the forecast error in real wages at longer horizons are also
unexplained by the structural shocks.
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(10) w = w,' + r,(L)(v, e,, d', d,) + A,(L)(m,)
where m, is the measurement error shock. These shocks are serially uncorrelated and
uncorrelated with the structural shocks.
Equation (6) shows that there is a cointegrating relationship between the real wage and
the output-to-labor ratio, which is a linear transformation of the marginal product of labor.
Equations (6), (8), and (9) also show that labor supply and aggregate demand shocks have only
transitory effects on the real wage and average labor productivity. To identify the "measurement
error" shock, I study the difference between the real wage and the average productivity of labor:
(11) w, - (y,-h) - r(v,, e,, dI, d1 )+ A,(L)(m,)
Equations (8), (9), and (11) describe the dynamics of the model specified by equations
(1) through (3) by imposing the long-run restrictions on hours, output and wages. The dynamics
of the other two variables in the system, the inflation rate and the real interest rate, are not
restricted by the model.
The Role of Oil Prices
Even after including the dynamics of the inflation rate and the real interest rate, the model
described above is still incomplete. During the 1970s and 1980s, there were several oil shocks.
Of particular note are the first OPEC shock in 1973-74, the second OPEC shock in 1979
following the fall of the Shah of Iran, and the collapse of oil prices during 1985-86. In addition,
it appears that the process for real (or nominal) oil prices has changed from one characterized
by infrequent though generally large discrete changes in nominal oil prices that persisted through
the early 1980s, to one more closely resembling the volatility of other commodity price series
since the early 1980s.
Hamilton (1983) shows that oil price shocks were an important cause of recessions even
in the pre-OPEC era.' SW add real oil prices to the model and treat them as exogenous. This
assumption is equivalent to stating that the level of aggregate demand in the U.S. does not affect
real oil prices. Because the real oil price is exogenous, SW write the oil price shock as the
change in the real price of oil.
I can now complete the description of the restrictions of the SW model. SW treat oil
shocks as supply shocks that have permanent effects on output, but no permanent effects on
hours.5 With the capital-to-output ratio assumed constant in the long run, this implies that oil
shocks have permanent effects on real wages because of their effects on the capital-to-labor
ratio.' An increase in real oil prices will lower the long-run capital-to-labor ratio, causing a
permanent decline in real wages.
III. DATA
This section discusses the data used in this paper. First, it describes the data series I use.
Next, it discusses the time series properties of these data series. I focus on unit root tests, as
'Mork (1989) extends Hamilton's analysis and finds that oil price shocks have asymmetric
effects on output. He finds that the large oil price decrease in 1986 did not cause a significant
increase in output.
sI allow real oil prices to have permanent effects on output thus treating real oil prices as I
do other aggregate supply shocks. Arguments can be made that real oil price shocks are really
aggregate demand shocks, affecting output through wealth effects and not through the production
function. If an increase in oil prices lowers the value of existing capital by making it more
expensive to operate, owners of capital will be worse off and will adjust their lifetime
consumption plans. Thus, even if the effects of oil price shocks operate through aggregate
demand channels, their effect will be permanent. Because of the separation of shocks into those
with permanent and strictly transitory effects on output, it is appropriate to treat oil price shocks
as aggregate supply shocks in this model.
'Real oil price shocks should not have permanent effects on output when output is measured
as value added, as implied by the production function (3) and the choice of data (real gross
domestic product). If a value-added production function exists then the long-run capital-to-output
ratio cannot be affected by real oil prices and real oil prices can have no permanent effect on
output or real wages. By leaving the long-run effects of real oil prices on output and real wages
unrestricted, I allow the data to speak to this issue.
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well as prior beliefs, in determining the appropriate degree of differencing of the data. Finally,
it analyzes the properties of the real oil price series that can affect the choice of sample period.
Data Sources
All data series are quarterly and seasonally adjusted, unless otherwise indicated. The
choice of data series was dictated by the goal of most accurately describing the dynamics of the
domestic U.S. economy.
Output is measured by the gross domestic product (GDP) of the non-farm, non-housing
private sector.' Nominal GDP is deflated by the appropriate GDP deflator. The hours data are
hours of all persons in the non-farm business sector from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
Productivity and Costs Document. The hours data includes the housing sector, but this should
have little effect on the results, as the housing sector employs relatively few people. Nominal
oil prices are measured as the producer price index for crude oil and are not seasonally adjusted.
The nominal interest rate is the market rate on U.S. three month treasury bills.
The wage series is constructed as follows: I begin with total nominal wages and salaries
paid in the private sector (excluding government and government enterprises) from the National
Income and Product Accounts. I deflate this by the GDP implicit price deflator for the non-farm,
non-housing private sector. Finally, I divide by hours of all persons in the non-farm business
sector to construct a measure of real hourly wages. I chose this wage series over the more
frequently used series of wages of production and non-supervisory employees in the
manufacturing sector because my series provides broader coverage and is more comparable with
the output and hours series I use. This wage series does not exclude farm and housing sector
workers. Again, because these sectors contribute little to the aggregate wage bill, the results
should not be sensitive to their inclusion.
'See Shapiro and Watson (1988) for a discussion of the problems associated with using farm
and housing sector data.
'I have examined the sensitivity of the results to the choice of wage series, and found them
to be quantitatively very similar.
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Time Series Properties
Estimation of a VAR system like that described above must take into account the time-
series properties of the data. In particular, I must consider two factors: The left hand side
variables for each equation must be stationary, and all cointegrating relationships must be taken
into account.
As discussed above, equation (1) implies that h, is an integrated process. Equation (4)
also implies that y, has two permanent components, one due to growth in the labor force (v,) and
the other due to growth in technology (e,). Labor supply shocks can have no long-run effects on
the output-to-labor ratio. I take this cointegrating-like relationship into account by substituting
(y, - h,) for y, when estimating the model. (y, - h,) still has a permanent component due to
growth in technology. The results of augmented Dickey-Fuller tests using six lags shown in
Table 1 indicate that (y, - h,) still contains a unit root. This series must be first differenced.
There is no similar theoretical guidance for determining the appropriate differencing for
the inflation rate and real interest rate series. The augmented Dickey-Fuller t-statistic for the
presence of a unit root in the inflation rate is -2.64. This is very close to the 10 percent critical
value of -2.57 for the test including a constant. The hypothesis of a unit root can not be rejected
at the 5 percent significance level, and can barely be rejected at the 10 percent level.
I chose to difference the inflation rate. This allows aggregate supply and demand shocks
to have permanent effects on the inflation rate. Barsky (1987) shows that inflation has become
much more persistent in the post-war period. Shapiro (1993) analyzes the times series properties
of the inflation rate measured by change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Shapiro finds that
the results of unit root tests are sensitive to the choice of sample period. The longer the period
is extended past the Volcker disinflation of the early 1980s, the more mean-reverting inflation
looks. One argument for this is that Volcker was successful in using monetary policy to
eliminate much of the inflation that persisted through the 1970s. Given the low inflation rates
during the 1980s, I find this somewhat persuasive evidence that Volcker's disinflation has had
permanent, or at least very persistent, effects. Similarly, the high inflation of the 1970s resulting
in part from the two OPEC oil shocks was quite persistent. These experiences suggest that
inflation is quite persistent, and that aggregate supply and demand shocks should be allowed to
have permanent or very persistent effects on its level.
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In choosing the appropriate differencing for a series it is important to consider the context
in which it is being used (Blough 1991). For the purposes here, it is more appropriate to allow
the aggregate demand and supply shocks to have permanent effects on the level of inflation and
let the data determine their importance. I examine the sensitivities of the main findings of this
paper to treating inflation as a stationary process and find that they are robust to this
modification.
The augmented Dickey-Fuller t-statistic for the real interest rate is -3.08. The hypothesis
of a unit root can be rejected at better than the five percent significance level (critical value of -
2.89) but not at the 10 percent level. The Solow model predicts a constant real interest rate at
all steady states, assuming population growth is constant. The stationarity of the change in hours
is equivalent to saying that population growth rates are mean reverting. Because of the
inconclusive results from the Dickey-Fuller test and the view that real interest rates are constant
in the long run, I treat the real interest rate as stationary.
Equation (6) clearly indicates that real wages are integrated. Equation (6) also shows that
there should be a cointegrating relationship between w, and (y,-h,) with a cointegrating vector (1,
-1). The augmented Dickey-Fuller t-statistic for the w,-(y,-h,) is -3.20. This is slightly larger than
the 10 percent critical value of -3.08 for the test including a constant and a time trend. Although
the hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected at the 10 percent significance level, I chose to
treat this series as trend stationary.
Permanent movements in the difference between the real wage and marginal product of
labor are difficult to explain. Even within models with sticky wages and long-term implicit labor
contracts, real wages adjust to clear the labor market in the long run. Further, the "measurement
error" described above, which allows long-term implicit contracts to be a possible source of this
difference, is inconsistent with permanent movements in this series due to the presence of a
stochastic trend. The series must be detrended for it to be stationary. I estimate the trend to be -
.26 percent per quarter (at an annualized rate) with a standard error of .014. The presence of a
deterministic trend is also difficult to explain, though the lack of permanent effects of the
measurement error on real wages is more consistent with the measurement error story. I find that
measurement errors have very persistent effects on real wages, suggesting a possible specification
error. The negative trend may be due to the inclusion of the shrinking wage bill of farm workers
in the numerator of the constructed real wage series and the exclusion of the hours of these same
workers from the denominator. I examine the sensitivity of the results to the choice of trend-
stationarity. Because the measurement error is exogenous to the rest of the model, the choice
of difference stationarity vs. trend stationarity affects only the response of the real wage to the
five structural shocks. The results are generally robust to this change in specification, although
the response of wages to labor supply shocks does differ somewhat.
Sample Period Selection
I estimate the model for two sample periods: 1951:1 to 1985:4 and 1951:1 to 1992:2.
The first period is identical to that used by Shapiro and Watson (1988). This sample period has
several advantages over the longer period. First, during the 1980s the process for real oil prices
seems to have changed from one dominated by long periods of relative constancy interrupted by
large fairly discrete increases, to a highly variable process more closely resembling the volatility
of other commodity prices sometime during the 1980s. Figure 1 shows real oil prices from
1951:1 to 1992:2. I examine the correlograms of the real oil price series, allowing for breaks in
the process between 1979 and 1988. There is no conclusive break point. For example, prior to
1983:1, the first five autocorrelations are 0.96, 0.92, 0.88, 0.82, and 0.76 and from 1983:1 to
1992:2 they are 0.90, 0.76, 0.69, 0.61, and 0.54. Similarly, the autocorrelations prior to 1986:1
are 0.98, 0.96, 0.94, 0.91, and 0.88 and beginning in 1986:1 are 0.37, -0.10, -0.09, -0.14, and -
0.22.
In addition to the ambiguous choice of a breaking point, a second issue is that the only
large real oil price decline occurred during 1986. Mork (1989) find that oil price shocks have
asymmetric effects on output. The large decrease in the price of oil did not cause a substantial
increase in output. Including this in the sample period might produce extremely misleading
results. Because of this problem, Shapiro and Watson chose to limit their sample period to
ending in 1985:4.
I chose to estimate the model for both sample periods. Despite the problems with the
longer period, limiting the sample excludes more than six years of available data. I find that
results from the longer period are substantially different from those from the shorter period.
These results are also difficult to interpret because they appear to be dominated by the fall in oil
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prices following the collapse of OPEC in 1986. In an attempt to correct for the possibility that
this large fall in oil prices affected the economy differently from prior real oil price shocks, I
include a variable in the analysis that effectively dummies out the change in oil prices during the
first two quarters of 1986. In addition, to deal with the change in the persistence of the oil price
series, I include a variable that is equal to zero prior to 1983:1 and is equal to the change in real
oil prices beginning in 1983:1. I chose. 1983:1 as the breaking point after examining the
correlograms described above. After I make these modifications, the results are still quite
different from those from the shorter period, again with the differences dominated by the negative
oil shocks and increased volatility of oil prices since 1985. I have not examined the sensitivity
of the results to changes in the breaking point.
IV. ESTIMATION STRATEGY














































This paper estimates the model described by (12) and (13). It uses an instrumental
variables approach similar to that described by Shapiro and Watson. The first five equations will
be estimated as in SW, except that I impose the additional overidentifying equation that labor
supply shocks have no permanent effects on real wages or the marginal product of labor. SW
test but do not impose this restriction. They find that the hypothesis that labor supply shocks
have the same permanent effects on hours and output cannot be rejected. Imposing the restriction
that these responses are the same in the long run is equivalent to imposing the restriction that
labor supply shocks have no permanent effects on real wages, because they have no permanent
effects on the capital-to-labor ratio.
The real wage equation will be estimated as a supplementary equation, though care will
be taken to make the wage shock orthogonal to the five structural shocks.
Equation (12) can be summarized as X, = A(L)s,, where s, is the vector of structural
shocks. E(s,s',) = f, a diagonal matrix, and E(s,s',.,) = 0. The first describes the mutual
orthogonality of the shocks; the second forces the shocks to be serially uncorrelated. The vector
of structural shocks, s,, can be directly estimated.
A(L) and s, will be estimated by inverting the estimable, finite autoregressive form A(L)-
'X(t) = s,. Given that A(1) from (13) is lower triangular, it can easily be shown that A(1)' is
also lower triangular. This transformation allows me to impose the long-run restrictions
embodied in A(l) on the sum of the estimated autoregressive parameters. This will be
The identification of the model is summarized by the matrix of long-run multipliers:
15 16
demonstrated below.
As described above, I estimate the autoregressive form of the model. The hours equation
will be estimated as:
p p p
(15) Ah, - E pMAht,, + P Aot, + P, 4A(y-h),.
J-1 J-0 J-o
P P
+ phufen- + p hrf-f+ t
Equation (14) does not impose the long-run restrictions from A(1)-'. The restrictions
require that there be no permanent effects on hours from any of the shocks other than the labor-
supply shocks. I can impose these restrictions by restricting the sets of coefficients on changes
in oil prices, changes in output, changes in the rate of inflation, and the real interest rate to each
sum to zero. I implement this restriction by differencing the right hand side variables whose
associated shocks must have no permanent effects. I can rewrite equation (14) as9:
P P1 -
(15) Ah, - PM,Ah,i + E y, ,4A
2o + yhJA2(y-h),, +
>-1 >-0 >-o
EZ TX3A't-i + Y~,j ri+ Vr
J-0 J-0
Similarly, I write the output equation as
'The following is an example of how double differencing works: Suppose there is a unit
sized shock to oil prices in period t, and no other shocks. Using equation (21), Ah, = y,, Ah,,,
=-Yho + Y.,,' Ah,.2 = -ho. + Y.2, Ah.13 = -7.2 + Y h, 4 = -jb, + . Ah,., = -'s4 + Y,
Ah,= -y,. This sums to zero. If the net change in A is equal to zero, then there is no long-
run effect of oil price shocks on the level of h,.
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(16) A(y-h), - YyJA 2hrJ + E p,, +or- * 4AE (y-h),_1 +
p-1 P-1
SyA2n,_, + E yr,_ +e,
1-0 1-0
the inflation rate equation as
P P P
(17) An, = E pi 5 Ah, 1 + X px,Ao,_, + p,1A(y-h),, +
1-0 1-0 1-0
P p
E pX +rg *  P,_jtf, + d,
and the real interest rate equation as
(18) r, * PArr *h  , + X PrA(y-h), +
, , ,+2( A,, -,_ + i: p,5_ + d
/-0 /-i
The output equation imposes the restrictions that aggregate demand shocks have no
permanent effects on output, and that labor supply shocks have the same long-run impact on
output as they do on hours. I impose the restriction that labor supply shocks have no long-run
effect on the output-to-labor ratio by double differencing the change in hours.
Unless there are restrictions on the contemporaneous effects of the labor supply shock on
output, the change in the inflation rate, or the real interest rate, the contemporaneous values of
these variables will be correlated with the residual in the hours equation. Thus equation (15) can
not be estimated by OLS. Similarly, equations (16) through (18) cannot be estimated by OLS
because of the contemporaneous correlation of the structural shocks (e,, d',, d21) with the included
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contemporaneous regressors (except the contemporaneous change in real oil prices, which is
exogenous). Following Shapiro and Watson, I will use an instrumental variables procedure that
uses lags 1 through p of Ah,, Ay,, ,, and r,, and lags 0 through p of Ao, as instruments.
Because equations (15) through (18) can be ordered as in the text and estimated in sequence, the
residuals from the prior equations are also valid instruments and are used. For example, the
residual from the hours equation is used as an instrument in the output equation. Including the
residuals from the prior equations as instruments orthogonalizes the estimated residuals, making
It unnecessary to use the Choleski decomposition to estimate the structural shocks.
However, the two demand shocks estimated by (17) and (18) will not be separately
identified. Although the estimation procedure imposes an ordering on the two equations that
causes there to be no contemporaneous effects of d21 on the change in the inflation rate, I find
this contemporaneous restriction implausible. For this reason, following Shapiro and Watson,
I avoid analysis of the separate effects of the two demand shocks on output and the real wage.
Estimation of the real wage equation is different. First, recall that neither the real wage
"measurement error" shock or the change in real wages entered into equations (14) to (18). I
treat the "measurement error" shock as exogenous to the system, and allow it to affect only the
relationship between real wages and the average productivity of labor, which is equal to --
excluding constants - the marginal product of labor in the long run after the capital stock has
adjusted. Equation (6) shows that in the long run, real wages are equal to the marginal product
of labor. In the short run I allow off-the-labor supply curve behavior by consumers, labor
hoarding behavior by firms, and long-term labor contracts where the wage is not allocative in the
short run. Thus the labor supply shocks, technology shocks, oil shocks, and demand shocks can
have transitory effects on the difference between the real wage and marginal product. The main
observation being made is that these five shocks cannot explain all of the variance in the real
wage. The dynamics of the real wage minus the marginal product will help us identify the
"measurement error" shock, as well as the cyclicality of real wages in response to supply and
demand shocks.
I will estimate the following equation for the real wage:
(19) (w-(y-h)), - EP~,h,.. + P*,, + E p,,,A(y-h),1 +
E pw A _ . E p,., + p ,(w-(y-h)),., + m
Equation (19) can be estimated by OLS because m, is by assumption orthogonal to all of the
included regressors. By including the contemporaneous values of the left-hand side variables
from equations (15) through (18), as well as the full set of regressors and instruments from those
equations, as regressors in equation (19), I ensure that the structural residuals and the oil price
shock are orthogonal to "measurement error" shock.
V. Results
I estimate the model described by equations (15) through (19) using six lags. Each
equation includes a constant. The oil price equation is not estimated, but the series of changes
in real oil prices is demeaned. The model is estimated over both sample periods, but the
discussion will focus on the shorter sample.
I present the results in three ways. First, I examine the impulse response functions of
output, average labor productivity, and real wages in response to each of the three aggregate
supply shocks.'0 Second, I analyze the decomposition of forecast error variance for output and
real wages to assess the importance of each of the shocks for explaining output and real wage
movements. Third, I use the 4-, 8-, and 16-quarter ahead forecast errors in output and the real
wage to construct two measures of cyclical covariance. I examine both the simple correlations
of the forecast errors in real wages and output and the elasticities of real wages with respect to
output in response to each of the shocks.
m0It is not possible to separately identify the impulse response functions for the aggregate
demand shocks because the shocks themselves are not separately identified. Any analysis of the
impulse response functions for the two demand shocks would be misleading.
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Impulse Response Functions
I use the impulse response functions and k-quarter ahead forecast errors to examine the
cyclicality of real wages in response to each of the shocks: If output and wages move in the
same direction in response to a shock, I describe this as a procyclical movement in the real wage;
conversely, if wages and output move in opposite directions then the real wage is countercyclical.
Figure 2 (panels a through i) shows the impulse response functions of output, the real
wage, and average labor productivity to the three supply shocks. Each figure is plotted with one-
standard-error bands around the estimated impulse response function. The standard errors were
calculated by bootstrapping from the vectors of structural shocks and the measurement errors 500
times, simulating the paths of all variables using the bootstrapped shocks, and re-estimating the
model. For all simulations, the actual series of real oil prices is used.
Figures 2a through 2c show the response to a unit sized labor supply shock. As shown
earlier, this shock will have a unit sized long-run effect on hours and output, and no permanent
effect on real wages or the average productivity of labor. The effect of labor supply shocks on
real wages is not precisely estimated. In the short run, this effect is nearly zero. After two
years, the effect is negative but a one standard error band around the estimated response includes
a wide range of positive and negative values. Given the imprecision of the estimates, it is
difficult to conclude that real wages are either procyclical or countercyclical in response to labor
supply shocks.
The point estimates of the impulse response functions indicate that real wages adjust more
slowly than average labor productivity to a labor supply shock. Labor supply shocks
predominantly represent changes in the number of new entrants to the labor force. The slower
adjustment of real wages may indicate that the slope of the age-wage relationship is shallower
than the slope of the age-productivity relationship following the entry of younger workers into
the labor force. If firms can construct compensation schemes where wages grow more slowly
than productivity, this will discourage quits and reduce turnover costs.
After the first quarter, labor productivity falls. This may be partially explained by slow
adjustment of the capital stock in response to an increase in the labor force. This explanation,
however, is difficult to reconcile with the forecastability of the labor supply. Even though the
hours series has a large stochastic component, most changes in the labor force are due to chages
in the growth of the working age population that are forecastable many years in advance, giving
firms ample time to adjust the capital stock to accomodate new workers." However, factors
that affect the labor force participation rate, like permanent changes in tax policy, increases in
the availability of disability insurance, and changes in female labor force participation, may be
less forecastable. The capital stock may be slow to adjust to these labor supply shocks.
Alternatively, the decrease in average labor productivity may reflect changes in the composition
of the labor force toward less experienced workers. Compositional changes could be due to
either changes in the retirement rates of older, more productive workers or changes in the
entrance rate of younger, less experienced workers.
Figures 2d though 2f show the responses of output, real wages, and average labor
productivity to oil price shocks. Initially, all three variables increase in response to an increase
in real oil prices. This initial increase is small relative to the large decreases in each of the
variables that trough after about one year. Real wages and output move closely together,
indicating that real wages are procyclical in response to oil price shocks. Rotemberg and
Woodford (1992) show that with value-added data this result is a puzzle unless there is imperfect
competition and countercyclical markups. They argue that a constant or procyclical markup is
not able to explain the large decline in output and real wages in response to oil price shocks.
However, as I show below, the responses of output and real wages to aggregate demand shocks
are more consistent with sticky wage models than with models with countercyclical markups.
The procyclicality of real wages in the short run in response to oil price shocks is
consistent with the more traditional notion of oil price shocks as aggregate supply shocks. If an
increase in oil prices shifts in the aggregate supply curve along a stable aggregate demand curve,
output should fall and prices should increase. If nominal wages are stickier than nominal prices,
the increase in the price level will result in decreases in the real wage. Alternatively, an oil price
shock can be characterized as a shock to the labor demand curve. In a market clearing model,
a shift in the labor demand curve along a stable labor supply curve moves hours and wages in
"If the capital stock adjusts in anticipation of an increase in the labor supply, output should
increase prior to the realization of the labor supply shock, as well. The model estimated here
does not deal with this possibility.
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the same direction.
In the long run, output, real wages, and average labor productivity are all lower.
Although this is inconsistent with equation (4), a value-added production function, it might reflect
some complementarity between energy and capital usage in production. If energy becomes more
expensive, firms may want to economize on its use by substituting labor input for capital and
energy inputs. In the short run, capital and labor may not be very substitutable in a given
production process. So, even if the long-run effect is that for a given capital stock firms would
increase their demand for labor, in the short run firms will find it difficult to make this
substitution and unprofitable to utilize all of their capital. Effective labor demand will decrease
in the short run. In the long run, firms will use less capital in production but will be able to
substitute labor for capital so the capital-to-labor ratio and the marginal product of labor would
both be lower. And, since there is no long-run effect of oil prices on hours, output must be
lower in the long run. The difference between the short- and medium-run substitutability of
capital and labor might explain the sharp drop in output in the short run and the partial recovery
just a few quarters later.
Figures 2g and 2i show the responses of output, real wages, and labor productivity to a
unit sized technology shock. Over both the short run and the long run, real wages and output
move together resulting in procyclical movements in real wages. The long-run effect on wages
and output must be the same, and equal to (1/a)' 2 times the size of the technology shock. In
the short run, an increase in technology shifts the labor demand curve out along the upward
sloping labor supply curve. Hours, output, and real wages should all increase, resulting in
procyclical movements in the real wage.
During the adjustment process, the increase in average labor productivity should be less
than the increase in output because the capital stock should be slow to adjust to the higher level
of technology. I find, however, that average productivity exceeds output over at least the first
nine years. I have examined the effect of technology shocks on hours. Technology shocks can
"This comes from the production function. The permanent effect of a one percent increase
in the level of technology is an increase of (1/a) percent in the capital stock, and hence a (1/a)
percent increase in the capital to labor ratio and the real wage.
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have no permanent effects on hours. In the short run, the response is unrestricted. I find that
hours respond negatively to a technology shock during the adjustment process. This suggests that
the income effect of technology shocks is greater than the substitution effect due to higher wages
making leisure more expensive. However, the desired increase in the capital stock should
mitigate against this. These effects must exactly cancel in the long run, as labor supply is
unaffected by wages.
Because the short-run dynamics of the model are unrestricted, a technology shock may
also cause a transitory shift in the labor supply curve. Shapiro and Watson (1988) find that
technology shocks lower the real interest rate in the short-run. The reduction of the real interest
rate may shift the labor supply curve to the left. When both the labor supply and labor demand
curves shift, the effect on hours becomes ambiguous, while the effect on wages must be
unambiguously positive. Again, because of a desired build-up in the capital stock, one might
expect that interest rates should increase, shifting the labor supply curve in the opposite direction.
A third possible explanation is that most technological improvements are labor-saving in
nature. In the short run, firms increase output with fewer employees and wages of those
employed rise. Over the medium run, the capital stock has been built up and firms increase
employment. In the long run, the capital stock and capital-to-labor ratio will both be higher.
Decomposition of Variance
The top panel of Table 2 shows the decomposition of forecast error variances for output.
Initially, labor supply shocks explain 40 percent of the variance in output. At the eight year
horizon, this increases to 56 percent. It is not controversial that labor supply explains more than
half of the permanent movements in output. The large contribution of labor supply shocks to the
forecast errors in output at business cycle frequencies may appear surprising. Quite to the
contrary, this effect might be expected. Following Shapiro and Watson (1988), I allow hours to
have a stochastic component. This component is estimated to be quite large. Since the dynamics
of hours is nearly a random walk, factors that move hours in the long run must also be important
in the short run. And, aside from the effects of technology shocks, increases in output must be
closely related to increases in hours. It then follows that if labor supply shocks are important
in explaining hours in the long run, they must be important in explaining output at all horizons.
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Technology shocks explain little of the variance in output at short horizons.
Mechanically, this comes from the negative effect of technology on hours, which reduces the
effect of technology shocks on output in the short run. In the long run, technology shocks
explain approximately 30 percent of the forecast errors in output. On average, oil price shocks
explain little of the variance in output. As will be shown below, oil prices were important causes
of the recessions of 1974-1975 and 1980-1982, but explained little of the variance in output
during the rest of the period.
Aggregate demand shocks explain a large percentage of the forecast error variance in
output at business cycle frequencies. I find that aggregate demand explains 43 percent of the 8-
quarter ahead forecast error variance. This is substantially larger than the 20 percent found in
SW. I attribute this difference to the restriction that labor supply shocks have no permanent
effects on real wages. When I follow SW and do not impose the restriction that hours and output
have identical long-run responses to labor supply shocks, which is equivalent to the restriction
that labor supply shocks have no permanent effects on real wages, I find that aggregate demand
shocks explain 23 percent of the 8-quarter ahead forecast error variance in output. This
difference is also reflected in the explanatory power of technology shocks. In the unrestricted
model, technology shocks explain 29 percent of the 8-quarter forecast error variance, compared
with the nine percent found with the restricted model. I also find that aggregate demand shocks
are more persistent in the restricted model. They explain 20 percent of the 32-quarter ahead
forecast error in output in the restricted model compared with nine percent in the unrestricted
model.
Table 2 also presents the decompositions of the forecast error variances for real wages.
At the shortest horizons, the measurement error shock accounts for approximately 40 percent of
the forecast error variance." The contribution of the measurement error is quite persistent.
After 32 quarters, the measurement error shock still explains nearly 26 percent of the variance
in real wages.
"The measurement error explains 41.7 percent of the 1-quarter ahead forecast error variance
in real wages with a standard error of 6.3 percent. I find this persuasive evidence that the five
structural shocks do not explain all of the variance in real wages, and that the addition of the
measurement error shock is appropriate in this framework.
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Labor supply shocks are relatively unimportant at all horizons, explaining no more than
four percent of the forecast error variance in real wages at any horizon. Technology shocks are
most important in explaining the forecast error variance of real wages. At business cycle
frequencies (one to 12 quarters), technology shocks explain between 29 and 37 percent of the
forecast error variance. At the infinite horizon, technology shocks explain nearly all of the
forecast error variance in real wages. Oil price shocks are also important in explaining the
forecast error variance in real wages. They explain more than 15 percent of the variance in the
12-quarter ahead forecast error. Oil price shocks have permanent effects on real wages. At the
infinite horizon they will explain all the variance in real wages not explained by the technology
shocks. Aggregate demand shocks explain 30 percent of the one-quarter ahead forecast
error variance. Their contribution to the variance in real wages falls of more rapidly than their
contribution to the variance in output.
K-Quarter Ahead Forecast Errors
The k-quarter ahead forecast errors are closely related to the impulse response functions
and variance decompositions described above. I analyze the forecast errors for three reasons.
First, the graphs of the forecast errors in output and real wages, figure 3 panels a through d,
provide information on the importance of each of the shocks in explaining the business cycles
during the sample period." Second, the correlation between the k-quarter ahead forecast errors
of output and real wages provides a simple summary statistic for the cyclical properties of real
wages in response to the different shocks. Finally, I can use the series constructed from the
forecast errors to estimate the output elasticity of real wages in response to each of the shocks.
I can then compare these estimated elasticities with more standard estimates available in the
literature.
The decomposition of variance indicated that, on average, labor supply shocks were
responsible for much of the movements in output but little of the movements in the real wage.
This is clearly indicated on figure 3a. Labor supply shocks were particularly important in
"See Shapiro and Watson (1988) for an episodic description of the business cycles during
the sample period.
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causing the recession of 1975. It is difficult to infer the cyclicality of real wages in response to
labor supply shocks from this figure.
Figure 3b shows that wages and output move closely together in response to oil price
shocks. Figure 3b also explains why oil price shocks on average explain relatively little of the
forecast error variance in output. Except in the recessions of 1974-1975 and 1980-1982, oil price
shocks have relatively small effects on output or real wages. But, both of the two large oil
shocks in the 1970s had substantial impacts on output. In particular, the OPEC I shock explained
more than one third of the movements in output during the 1975 recession that could not be
expected eight quarters earlier. The second OPEC shock also explains much of the decrease in
output in the in the 1980-82 double dip recession. This figure, however, also supports
Hamilton's (1983) finding that even in the pre-1973 period, increases in oil prices preceded
recessions. Figure 3b suggests that oil price shocks played some role in the 1954 and 1958
recessions.
Technology shocks were important, on average, in explaining the movements in output
and real wages over the 1951 - 1985 period. Figure 3c also shows the importance of technology
shocks in general. Again, real wages and output move closely together. Episodic analysis of the
technology shocks is less clear cut. The series of mostly negative technology shocks from 1966
to 1971 corresponds to the onset of the productivity slowdown of the late 1960s and early 1970s.
It also appears that many of the movements in output from the late 1950s to the mid 1960s were
due to faster than average growth in productivity. And, the 1980s seems to have been a period
of frequently negative technology shocks. The series of negative productivity shocks in the
1980s may be due to the declining percentage of output from the high productivity manufacturing
sector and increasing percentage from the lower productivity service sector. The importance of
especially rapid technology growth in the 1960s and slower growth in the 1980s may help explain
why earlier studies of real wage cyclicality found real wages to be slightly procyclical over the
entire post-war period, not just over the 1970s, a period conventionally thought to have been
dominated by supply shocks.
Figure 3d traces out the effects of aggregate demand shocks on output and the real wage.
The recession of 1981-82 is in great part explained by a negative aggregate demand shock,
validating its labeling as the "Volcker recession." There is also evidence that earlier Fed
27
tightenings were followed by recessions. The shifts in Fed policy identified by Romer and
Romer (1989) in 1955:2, 1968:4, 1974:2, 1978:3 and 1979:4 precede decreases in output due to
demand shocks by approximately 2 years. Romer and Romer (1989) find that the peak increase
in unemployment in response to a Romer date is 8 to 12 quarters after the initial shift in
monetary policy.
The countercyclicality of real wages in also generally apparent from this figure. Because
the demand shock is really a composite of two underlying demand shocks that might have
different effects on real wages, the cyclicality of real wages does vary more across time, although
not in any consistent fashion, than it does in response to the other shocks. This countercyclical
movement in real wages is consistent with models where nominal wages are stickier than nominal
prices. One way of thinking about equation (17) is that the included right hand side variables
forecast changes in the inflation rate. One part of the composite aggregate demand shock can
be interpreted as an inflation surprise." Then, if there is a Phillips curve, the unexpected
increase in inflation should raise output. If nominal wages are stickier than prices in the short
run and if there is involuntary unemployment so that workers are to the left of their short-run
labor supply curves, then the inflation surprise should also reduce real wages, inducing firms to
hire more labor. Similarly, if workers misperceive increases in nominal wages as increases in
real wages, there is effectively a temporary shift out in the labor supply curve and output would
increase and real wages would fall. The aggregate demand shocks have interesting effects on
average labor productivity as well. Unlike real wages, labor productivity increases in response
to aggregate demand shocks. This is consistent with firms hoarding or underutilizing their labor
forces during non-expansionary periods. Hall (1988) and Rotemberg and Summers (1990) offer
explanations for aggregate demand driven increases in labor productivity.
The series of k-quarter ahead forecast errors provide a computationally simple way of
quantifying the correlations of output and real wages in response to the aggregate supply and
aggregate demand shocks. These correlations indicate the cyclicality of real wages in response
to the structural shocks.
"The impulse response function for the shock from the inflation equation shows that output
increases and real wages decrease following the shock.
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Table 3 shows the correlations of the 4-, 8, and 16-quarter ahead forecast errors of output
and real wages. Tables 4a and 4b present the estimated output elasticities of real wages in
response to the structural shocks. The difference between Tables 4a and 4b is in the computation
of standard errors. The standard errors in Table 4a are generated by bootstrapping 500 times
from estimated structural shocks and are taken from the generated distribution of the elasticities.
The standard errors in Table 4b are estimated directly from the regressions of real wages on
output in response to each of the shocks. Table 4b reflects the intrasample variation in the
response of real wages to output, while Table 4a reflects the variation in average response across
the different simulated samples.
Labor supply shocks generate no consistent cyclical pattern in the real wage. The
estimated correlations are very imprecisely estimated. Similarly, the elasticities in Table 4a are
very imprecisely estimated, with standard errors up to ten times the size of the estimated
coefficients.
Oil price shocks generate movements in output and real wages that are nearly perfectly
correlated. The correlation in the four quarter ahead forecast errors is 0.88. At the 8 and 16
quarter horizons these correlations are 0.95. At the infinite horizon, this correlation is constrained
to be one because all movements in output in the long-run are due to reductions in the use of
capital, so that a one percent change in output is accompanied by a one percent change in the
capital-to-labor ratio and the marginal product of labor. The estimated elasticities of real wages
in response to output generated by the oil price shocks are very large. They are 1.38, 0.63, and
0.76 at the three horizons studied. Each is insignificantly different from one.
Similarly, the long-run responses of output and real wages to technology shocks are
identical. These responses are not constrained at the shorter horizons. Yet, they are very highly
correlated. The estimated correlations are 0.65, 0.80, and 0.93, with reasonably tight standard
errors at the two longer horizons. The estimated elasticities are 2.07, 0.81, and 0.87. Again,
each of these is insignificantly different from one. At the infinite horizon, this elasticity must
be equal to one.
Aggregate demand shocks cause countercyclical movements in real wages. The estimated
correlations between real wages and output in response to demand shocks are -0.32, -0.50, and -
0.53. These are less precisely estimated. However, the probabilities that these correlations are
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greater than one are only 9.3 percent and 9.0 percent at the 8 and 16 quarter horizons. These
correlations are unconstrained by the model at all horizons. At the longer horizons they would
not be very meaningful, as little of the long-run finite movements in real wages and output will
be explained by the demand shocks. The hypothetical regressions of real wages in response to
aggregate demand shocks on output in response to these same shocks show that at the four, eight,
and 16 quarter horizons, a one percent increase in output decreases real wages by 0.12 percent,
0.19 percent, and 0.16 percent, respectively. Again, using the standard errors from Table 4a,
these are imprecisely estimated, but the probabilities tht the elasticities are greater than zero are
less than 50 percent.
The structural shocks clearly generate different cyclical covariances of real wages and
output. This result casts doubt on the usefulness of studies of that constrain real wage cyclicality
to be the same across all business cycles. In addition, each business cycle generally has more
than one cause, and all of the shocks except the oil price shocks were important over the entire
sample period. Therefore, examining the covariance of real wages and output over different
sample periods is not very instructive. SBP use evidence of similar cyclicalities of real wages
over their sample period (1968 - 1987) and the post-war period through 1987 as evidence that
their results are generalizable to the earlier period. The results in this paper cast doubt on the
generalizability of the SBP findings. Similarly, macroeconomists have used the panel data results
as the new stylized facts about the cyclicality of real wages. This conclusion might have been
premature, as the structural shocks affect real wages differently.
Table 4 also presents evidence on the cyclicality of the forecast errors due to the sum of
all of the structural shocks. The output elasticities of real wages are -0.005, 0.183, and 0.357 at
the four, eight, and 16 quarter horizons. At the two longer horizons, the elasticities are larger
than the 0.153 estimated by SBP for the 1948 - 1987 period, and comparable to the 0.293
estimated for the 1968 - 1987 period. Both estimates use aggregate wage data and are thus
susceptible to composition bias.
It is difficult to assess the implications of composition bias for examining the relative
cyclicality of real wages in response to the shocks identified by this paper without further
information on how each of the shocks affects the composition of the labor force. Although it
is implausible that all business cycles are alike, it is unlikely that the differences in the cyclicality
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of real wages across different business cycles described by Blanchard and Watson (1986) are due
to variation in composition bias. Similarly, it is impossible to conclude that, for example,
composition bias is more important in response to labor supply shocks, which generate no
consistent pattern of real wage cyclicality, than in response to technology shocks, which result
in procyclical real wages. For this reason, I will assume that composition bias is equally
important in the responses to each of the shocks.
One final issue must be addressed. It is possible that the inclusion of the measurement
error shock biases the results by imposing spurious procyclicality or countercyclicality on the
portion of real wage movements explained by the five structural shocks. I find little evidence
for this hypothesis.
Figure 4a shows the measurement error shocks generated by this model (variance
normalized to one). There is no apparent cyclical pattern. Figure 4b shows the 8-quarter ahead
forecast errors in the real wage due to the measurement error shock. Again, there is no apparent
cyclical pattern in these responses.
To search for any cyclical pattern in this series, I have estimated the correlations between
the forecast errors in real wages due to the measurement error shock and the forecast errors in
output explained by all of the shocks together. These correlations are 0.14, 0.10. and 0.16 at the
4-, 8-, and sixteen-quarter horizons, respectively. The standard errors are 0.09, 0.13, and 0.18.
There is little evidence that there is a cyclical pattern in the response of real wages to the
measurement error shock.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper uses a variant of the dynamic model of the U.S. economy in Shapiro and
Watson (1988) to study the cyclicality of real wages. The model identifies five structural shocks
that drive the macroeconomy: Labor supply shocks, technology shocks, oil price shocks, and two
aggregate demand shocks. I study the cyclicality of real wages in response to each of these
shocks. The five shocks cannot explain all of the variance in real wages. I add a real wage
equation to the model but cannot add a sixth structural shock. Instead, noting that there are
strictly non-allocative movements in the real wage, I add a measurement error to the real wage
equation. The measurement error can have only transitory effects on the real wage, and no
effects on any of the other variables.
There are important differences in the cyclicality of real wages in response to the
structural shocks. I find that labor supply shocks cause no consistent cyclical pattern in real
wages. Technology shocks and oil price shocks, which can both be interpreted as labor demand
shocks, cause real wages to move procyclically. There is less agreement on how real wages
should behave in response to aggregate demand shocks. Sticky nominal wage models fell out
of favor with macroeconomists when recent evidence showed that real wages are procyclical.
Models in which most movements in output are due to movements in aggregate demand needed
to be consistent with this evidence. Sticky price models can explain procyclical movements in
the real wage in response to aggregate demand shocks while sticky wage models cannot. Here,
I attempt to resolve this ambiguity. Within the context of the model estimated here, aggregate
demand shocks can cause real wages to move countercyclically even if the overall real wage
moves procyclically, because technology shocks and oil price shocks move real wages
procyclically. I find some support for the sticky wage models. Aggregate demand shocks cause
real wages to move countercyclically.
These findings demonstrate that simple correlations between real wages and output, hours,
or the unemployment rate do not adequately describe the facts about the cyclicality of real wages.
Models where aggregate demand shocks are dominant should be less concerned about matching
the stylized fact of an overall procyclical real wage. Models that predict countercyclical
movements in real wages in response to aggregate demand shocks are consistent with the
evidence presented here on real wage cyclicality. I find that aggregate demand shocks explain
in excess of 40 percent of the forecast error variance in real output at business cycle frequencies
and cause countercyclical movements in real wages.
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Table 1

























'Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests performed over the period from 1948:1 to 1992:2 using six
lags. Tests for a unit root in h, y,, (y,-h,), w1, and (w,-(y,-hJ) include a constant and a time trend.
The five and ten percent critical values, taken from Harvey (1990) are -3.45 and -3.15,
respectively. Tests for a unit root in ;, i,, and r, include a constant. The five and ten percent
critical values are -2.89 and -2.57, respectively.
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Table 2
Decomposition of Forecast Error Variance'
Table 2, Continued
Fraction of Real Wage Explained by Shock to




Quarter Supply Oil Technology Demand
1 40.2 0.2 2.1 57,5
(18.0) (2.0) (9.1) (28.4)
4 45.4 1.3 1.2 54.2
(18.3) (3.0) (6.5) (23.4)
8 38.4 9.6 9.2 42.8
(16.8) (6.9) (9.0) (15.7)
12 38.8 9.3 13.0 38.9
(16.6) (7.1) (9.9) (13.5)
20 44.9 8.0 17.3 29.8
(15.5) (6.9) (10.3) (10.9)
32 55.7 6.1 20.2 20.0
(13.9) (6.0) (10.5) (8.1)
Quarter Supply Oil Technology Demand Error
1 0.0 0.1 29.2 30.0 41.7
(7.5) (2.1) (14.1) (15.4) ( 6.3)
4 0.1 7.9 31.6 24.4 36.9
(7.3) (6.6) (14.8) (14.2) (7.7)
8 0.5 12.6 32.3 19.0 35.6
(6.9) (9.5) (14.9) (11.9) (8.3)
12 0.5 15.3 37.2 13.5 33.6
(6.2) (10.7) (14.5) (9.1) (8.0)
20 1.6 17.0 42.8 8.4 30.2
(5.7) (11.7) (15.0) (6.4) (8.0)
32 3.7 18.4 45.9 6.4 25.5
(6.6) (12.3) (16.4) (5.1) (7.9)
'Standard errors, in parentheses, are calculated by first bootstrapping 500 draws from the
series of structural shocks, next generating simulated series, and then reestimating the model.
Actual oil prices are used in all simulations.
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Table 3
Correlations of Real Wages and Output in Response to Shocks'
Table 4a
Elasticities of Real Wages with Respect to Output






























































































'The k-quarter ahead forecast errors are constructed as the moving average coefficients on
real wages and output times the realizations of the structural shocks. The forecast errors due to
aggregate demand shocks reported are the sum of the two forecast error series due to the
individual aggregate demand shocks. Standard errors, in parentheses, are calculated by first
bootstrapping 500 draws from the series of structural shocks, next generating simulated series,
and then reestimating the model. Actual oil prices are used in all simulations.
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'The reported values are the coefficients on output from regressions of the k-quarter ahead
forecast error in the real wage on a constant and the k-quarter ahead forecast error in output.
Standard errors, in parentheses, are calculated by first bootstrapping 500 draws from the series
of structural shocks, next generating simulated series, and then reestimating the model. Actual
oil prices are used in all simulations.
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Table 4b
Elasticities of Real Wages with Respect to Output
in Response to Shocks'

























































'See Table 4a for a description of the reported values. Standard errors of the coefficients




1951 1955 1959 1963 1967 1971 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991
42
a
Figure 2.a. Response at Output to Labor Supply ShocksFiue2d 
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Figure 2.e Response of Wages to Oil Price Shocks
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Figure 2.h. Response of Wages to Technology Shocks










Figure 1.b 8 Quarter Ahead Forecast Errors due to Measurement Error Shocks
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